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Securing compliance by law enforcement officers with legal limits on 
investigation and prosecution poses a formidable challenge.  Traditional remedies 
fall into two categories: nullification of prosecutions and suits for damages.  Courts 
will exclude illegally obtained evidence to denounce and discourage unreasonable 
searches and coerced confessions.  Courts likewise will reverse convictions when 
prosecutors fail to comply with such doctrines as those laid down in Batson1 and 
Brady.2   
The nullification sanction cannot be invoked by a deceased person.  More 
generally, it does not deter official misconduct inspired by motives other than the 
desire to obtain convictions.  Excessive use of force by police illustrates both 
limits.  Here, tort suits provide the primary remedy. 3   Both the nullification 
sanction and tort suits have serious drawbacks.   
The defects of the exclusionary rule are well known. 4   The unattractive 
prospect of freeing the guilty has led to the recognition of multiple exceptions.  It 
is also plausible to suspect that the prospect of exclusion has discouraged 
expansive understanding of substantive constitutional rights.  The logical point that 
ex ante compliance generally would have the same consequences as exclusion ex 
post has failed to overcome the reluctance to witness the price we pay for 
constitutional rights.   
Constitutional standards related to the trial process typically aim, among other 
things, at preventing factually erroneous convictions.  Reversing convictions when 
prosecutors fall short of constitutional standards, therefore, does not have the same 
public-relations problem as the exclusionary rule.  Only about one in twenty 
                                                                                                                            
 
*   Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego Law School.   
1   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that prosecutorial use of peremptory 
challenges in a single case may establish an equal protection violation).   
2   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process requires the prosecution 
to disclose material exculpatory information to the defense before trial).   
3   See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that police use of deadly force is 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and actionable under § 1983, when neither the crime of 
arrest nor the suspect’s behavior threatened the safety of the officer or future victims). 
4   For a review of these drawbacks, see, for example, Donald A. Dripps, The Case for the 
Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5–23 (2001).   
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convictions results from trial rather than a guilty plea. 5   Not all of the trial 
convictions lead to an appeal.  The trial doctrines are important both in the cases 
that go to trial and in those cases where a guilty plea reflects the prosecution’s 
risks at trial.  Nonetheless, only a very small minority of cases ever get to the 
Brady stage,6 let alone the Batson stage.   
The imperfections of tort actions are as well known as those of the 
exclusionary rule.7  Police defendants have a qualified immunity defense, together 
with a right to interlocutory appeal and a stay of discovery when the trial court 
rejects a summary judgment motion.8  These doctrines reflect the concern that the 
risk of large damages (passed through to the public by indemnification 
arrangements) might discourage vigorous law enforcement.  Individual tort suits, 
moreover, are quite ill-suited to high-frequency, low-damages violations, such as 
arbitrary stops for traffic or under Terry.9   
Tort suits play a substantial role.  The existence of indemnification 
agreements suggests that the risk of liability is real enough to motivate officers and 
their employers. 10   Millions of dollars are paid each year, although a precise 
estimate is not available.11  Video recording has provided a compelling counter to 
police credibility in some cases.  Even if tort suits have drawbacks, they offer the 
only practical deterrent for misconduct that is motivated by racism or sadism rather 
than by the desire to win a conviction.    
Both tort suits and the exclusionary rule could be made more robust by 
relatively minor reforms.  Even if the Supreme Court declines to reconsider the 
interlocutory review of pro-plaintiff rulings on immunity, the Court might be 
persuaded to abandon the discovery stay.  Similarly, marginal reforms might 
strengthen the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.  Examples include target 
                                                                                                                            
 
5   See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that ninety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are obtained through guilty pleas). 
6   See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that Brady does not require 
disclosure before entry of a guilty plea).  It should be noted that prosecutors’ offices often voluntarily 
disclose Brady material before they are required to do so.   
7   See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 4, at 18–21. 
8   See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that executive officers generally 
are protected by qualified immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that 
trial court rulings rejecting the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law are subject to 
interlocutory review prior to commencement of discovery).   
9   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).   
10   See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) (finding 
that employers paid 99.98% of the damages awarded against police officers in a large sample of 
departments). 
11  See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the 
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 759 (2004) (stating that a large sample of “news stories 
report significant and sometimes immense sums being paid out to settle abuse claims, as well as 
payment for many smaller claims”). 
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standing and reconsidering the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to 
vehicle searches.  These are not huge steps, but they could make a significant 
difference.   
Even a more effective remedial mix featuring a broader exclusionary rule and 
simpler procedures in tort cases would still have two major holes.  The first is 
illegal detention by the police, by Terry stops of pedestrians, pretextual traffic 
stops, or time spent in jail before a determination that probable cause for the arrest 
was lacking.  The vast majority of these constitutional violations yield no evidence 
to exclude.  Nor do they, individually, accrue the high damages necessary to justify 
the costs of litigation.   
The other hole in the remedial fabric is the prosecution function.  Prosecutors 
have absolute immunity against constitutional tort liability (unless they carry out 
investigations, when they are treated like police, with only qualified immunity).12  
Theoretically, the nullification sanction—dismissing prosecutions and reversing 
convictions—ought to provide strong incentives for compliance.  The difficulty 
within the criminal process is how hard constitutional violations are to prove.    
In the very high percentage of cases that end in guilty pleas, the defense gives 
up before trial.  When the defense does contest liability, the most obvious 
candidates for fuller enforcement are claims of selective or vindictive prosecution, 
and Brady violations.  The first type of claim is hard to prove because the 
substantive law turns on the prosecutor’s subjective intent.13  The second type is 
hard to prove because the defense typically does not know what the prosecution 
does not share.   
Efforts are underway to fill these gaps in the remedial structure.  With respect 
to the police, in 1994, Congress adopted the Rodney King law, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 
authorizing the Justice Department to seek structural reform injunctions against 
local police departments that engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional 
policing.  Institutional reform litigation emerged as a distinct phenomenon in the 
1970s.  As Abram Chayes observed in a classic article, where traditional private 
litigation was bipolar, retrospective, and episodic: 
 
The characteristic features of the public law model are very different 
from those of the traditional model. The party structure is sprawling and 
amorphous, subject to change over the course of the litigation. The 
traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed with 
                                                                                                                            
 
12  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have absolute 
immunity from suits brought under § 1983); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding 
that prosecutors alleged to have fabricated evidence during the investigation have qualified rather 
than absolute immunity).   
13  See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (“The requirements for a 
selective-prosecution claim draw on ‘ordinary equal protection standards.’ The claimant must 
demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.’” (citation omitted)).   
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negotiating and mediating processes at every point. The judge is the 
dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case, and he draws for 
support not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a wide range of 
outsiders—masters, experts, and oversight personnel. Most important, 
the trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of 
complex forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on 
persons not before the court and require the judge’s continuing 
involvement in administration and implementation. School 
desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners’ or inmates’ 
rights cases come readily to mind as avatars of this new form of 
litigation.14 
 
During this early period, the Supreme Court effectively precluded institutional 
reform litigation against municipal police departments by denying standing to 
plaintiffs who could not prove they would be future, as opposed to past, victims of 
police abuse.15 
Section 14141 bypassed the standing requirement by authorizing the Justice 
Department to bring suits for equitable relief.  Institutional reform litigation 
aggregates individual violations by alleging widespread violations tolerated by an 
unconstitutional institutional culture.  If an injunction is issued, it usually provides 
detailed regulations enforced by reporting requirements and the oversight of an 
independent monitor.  The independent monitor assumes the active supervisory 
role that Professor Chayes attributed to the judge in other cases of institutional 
reform litigation.    
Structural reform litigation functions much like a negotiated rule-making in 
administrative law.  Once the Justice Department informs the department that an 
investigation has found the threshold pattern or practice, the parties negotiate the 
terms of the consent decree with input from the police and the community.  When 
an agreement is reached, the district court enters the order.  In only a few recent 
cases have defendants elected to try the case rather than agree to an injunction.16   
                                                                                                                            
 
14  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1284 (1976).   
15  See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that plaintiff who alleged excessive 
force against the police had standing to seek damages but not injunctive relief).   
16  See United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (entering verdict for 
defendant Alamance County Sheriff after bench trial, finding United States failed to prove pattern or 
practice of constitutional violations); United States v. Town of Colorado City, No. 3:12–cv–8132–
HRH, 2015 WL 3774315 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2015) (rejecting summary judgment motions and setting 
trial of claims under, inter alia, § 14141, for trial).  The United States prevailed in a jury trial.  As to 
the § 14141 claims, the jury verdict is advisory and not binding on the district court.  See Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Wins Religious Discrimination Lawsuit Against 
Colorado City, Arizona, and Hildale, Utah (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-wins-religious-discrimination-lawsuit-against-colorado-city-arizona-and. 
2016] THE CIVIL SIDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  
 
 
5 
Some of our largest departments have been subjects of structural reform 
injunctions.  The list includes Los Angeles, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and 
Detroit.  Private class actions have overcome the standing hurdle, and led to 
injunctions against the New York Police Department17 and the Maricopa, Arizona 
sheriff's office.18   
The emergence of institutional reform litigation is the most dramatic 
development in constitutional criminal procedure since Mapp v. Ohio19 applied the 
exclusionary rule to the states in 1961.  We now have a wealth of data on 
experience with these court orders.  Do they work?  What do they cost, in dollars 
and in public security?  Three of our four articles address these issues.   
Michael White, Henry Fradella, Weston Morrow, and Doug Mellon review 
the history of stop-and-frisk law and then take a meticulous look at New York’s 
experience under a consent decree.20  They find that the number of reported stops 
fell dramatically after the order (a decrease of 93% from the peak reached in 
2011).  Stops after the order showed substantially the same racial distribution as 
before.  The quality of stops, as measured by hit rates for weapons seized and 
arrests made, rose dramatically.   
Did the decrease in the number of stops, accounting for the higher quality of 
those under the decree, lead to an unacceptable increase in crime?  Some tradeoff 
between liberty and security is inevitable.  It would not be a surprise if greater 
respect for constitutional standards reduced the efficiency of law enforcement.  
There is some evidence that, accounting for other variables, federal court 
intervention leads to an increase in crime, at least during the initial years of the 
consent decree.21 
As the authors note, a vigorous debate continues about whether the aggressive 
stop-and-frisk policy contributed to the city’s drop in crime prior to the order.  The 
authors find that after rising slightly just prior to the order, the city’s crime rate 
declined slightly (and for homicide, the decline was dramatic).  Many factors are at 
work, but the 93% decline in total stops is so catastrophic that we should expect 
that if there was a crime-control effect, we would see some sign of it.    
                                                                                                                            
 
17  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (entering structural 
reform injunction against NYPD). 
18  See Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that district court did not 
abuse discretion in entering structural reform litigation but that some terms in the order were 
overbroad).   
19  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).   
20  Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow & Doug Mellom, Federal Civil 
Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of the 
Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (2016). 
21  See Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017).  Using a difference-in-difference methodology, they find increases in crime that are both 
statistically significant and of substantial effect size.  Id.  They also find that this effect dissipates 
during the term of the order.  Id.    
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The authors close by observing that police reform “is a marathon, not a 
sprint.”22  Can progress achieved under federal court supervision be sustained after 
the order expires?  Joshua Chanin takes up this question in a detailed study of five 
departments (Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, Prince George’s County, 
and Los Angeles) that achieved substantial compliance with consent decrees under 
the Rodney King law.23  The impressive range of the study, covering five major 
departments, gives us a broad view of how federal intervention interacts with local 
institutional cultures.  Chanin’s findings on the impact of reform injunctions are 
largely consistent with those of White et al. respecting New York.  While the 
decrees were in force, citizen complaints, police use of force, and the costs of 
defending or settling civil rights suits generally declined.  Crime generally did not 
increase.  After the orders expired, experience varies.   
Chanin finds that in Cincinnati and Washington D.C., the injunction seems to 
have contributed to a long-term improvement in compliance and citizen 
satisfaction.  By contrast, in Pittsburgh, post-decree regression was substantial.  
Both Chanin and White et al. suggest that reform injunctions can secure substantial 
improvements in constitutional compliance but that long-term success depends on 
change in institutional culture.   
In our third article, Stephen Rushin takes up the question of what explains 
sustainable progress in some jurisdictions but not in others. 24   In a detailed 
examination of the experience in Los Angeles, Rushin finds a remarkable success 
story.  Compliance improved, the costs of defending tort suits dropped 
substantially, and crime did not increase.  This across-the-board progress, 
moreover, appears to have staying power.  In Los Angeles, new police leadership 
took the court order as an opportunity to adopt best practices rather than as ill-
conceived meddling.  The results so far have been impressive. 
Rushin contrasts the Los Angeles case study with that of the Alamance 
County, North Carolina, sheriff’s office.  The office refused to agree with the 
Justice Department and proceeded to trial.  The district court found insufficient 
evidence of a “pattern or practice” or constitutional violations.  An appeal is 
pending.   
The Alamance County case may (or may not) lead to appellate exposition of 
the “pattern or practice” criterion.  It may (or may not) encourage defiance rather 
than cooperation by other police departments.  By attributing success in Los 
Angeles to police internalization of constitutional values, his study invites the 
awkward question of just what would have happened if the Justice Department had 
won the trial.  An order would have issued, forcing at least some improvement in 
                                                                                                                            
 
22  White et al., supra note 20, at 65–66. 
23  Joshua Chanin, Evaluating Section 14141: An Empirical Review of Pattern or Practice 
Police Misconduct Reform, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2016).   
24  Stephen Rushin, Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in American 
Police Departments, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113 (2016).   
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short-term compliance.  After that?  It would be no surprise, albeit not a happy 
ending, if the departments most in need of reform proved most impervious to it.   
In our final article, Bruce Green and Sam Levine address the other big gap in 
criminal procedure’s regulatory structure—the prosecution function.25  They note 
that prosecutorial charging decisions are regulated very lightly by the 
constitutional law defendants can invoke.  Criminal procedure specialists have 
looked largely to administrative law for models of how charging discretion might 
be regulated.  Green and Levine explore the possibility that, at least in state courts, 
the professional ethical obligations of prosecutors might play a constructive role.   
They argue that regulating charging decisions by professional disciplinary 
actions against prosecutors is a genuine possibility.  They show that the ethics 
rules can be read to bar basing charging decisions on improper factors.  They also 
show that the assumption of plenary executive power over charge selection is a 
feature of federal constitutional law, not necessarily applicable in the state courts 
that process most criminal cases.   
Green and Levine do not claim a global solution to the problem of 
prosecutorial discretion.  For one thing, federal prosecutions would still be subject 
to the supposed constitutional executive prerogative.  For another, they 
(understandably, given the current state of the law) leave to another day the precise 
content of the constraints that might be imposed on charging decisions by general 
obligations of professional responsibility.  It bears emphasis that their turn to state 
bar authorities is in no competition with other efforts to bring about some “decent 
restraint of prosecutorial power.”26    
The full promise of the proposed turn to professional ethics can be seen in 
light of the other articles in the symposium.  Lasting improvement in public 
institutions depends largely on changes in the internal culture of those 
organizations.  The experience with structural reform litigation against police 
departments, thus far, suggests that external intervention can be expected to secure 
some immediate improvement in compliance, and that, in some cases at least, 
progress puts down roots.   
The police professionalism movement of the early twentieth century did not 
lead to a uniform national pattern of constitutional policing.  It did drive out some 
of the worst practices in some of the departments.27  Were some prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                            
 
25  Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy 
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 143 (2016). 
26  I borrow the phrase from James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).   
27  See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 12 (2003) (“The 
professionalism movement achieved many improvements in American policing.”); id.  (“Compared 
with the utter lack of professionalism that prevailed through the late nineteenth century, when police 
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charging decisions to become seen as not just unsavory, but positively 
unprofessional, we might see a similar effect on the prosecution function.   
Institutional reform suits against police departments and bar proceedings 
against prosecutors reflect a common assumption.  In both cases, abuse is seen as 
the exception rather than the rule.  The Justice Department began targeting the 
worst of the worst departments for investigations.  The number of large 
departments subjected to court orders may shake that assumption, especially if we 
factor in New York, subject to an order entered in a citizen’s class action suit, and 
Chicago, where the mayor’s police accountability task force just issued a report 
that is tantamount to an admission of liability under § 14141.28 
So too with prosecutors: occasional glaring excesses, of course, deserve 
correction.  If, however, the heart of the problem is the normal operation of a 
system in which outcomes are practically determined by executive discretion, 
larger solutions are in order.  But we have to start somewhere.   
For roughly the first century under the Constitution, civil litigation based on 
the common law torts of trespass, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution 
provided the primary regulation of American law enforcement.29  The reliance on 
private law made sense while criminal law enforcement, prosecution included, was 
conducted largely by private persons.  During the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the criminal justice became administered by full-time public 
officers, and the regulatory structure evolved.  A regime of administrative 
discretion regulated at the margins by exclusionary rules and the residual threat of 
tort liability has been in place ever since.  The articles in the Symposium invite the 
speculation that civil proceedings may bring criminal procedure back to the future, 
and provide some intriguing glimpses of what such a future might look like.   
 
                                                                                                                            
departments were the ‘adjuncts’ of political machines, the achievements of the professionalism 
movement were substantial.” (footnote omitted)).   
28  See POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING 
TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE (Apr. 2016), 
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf.  The report 
found that while Chicago’s population is about evenly divided among Caucasians, African-
Americans and Hispanics, 74% of those shot by police were black and only 8% were white, id. at 7; 
that 76% of those shocked with tasers were black and only 8% were white, id.; that 40% of 
complaints against police were not fully investigated by the Chicago Police Department, id. at 10; 
and that 1500 officers on the force had been the subject of 10 or more citizen complaints during the 
period 2007-2015, id. at 12.   
29  For purposes of illustration, an 1892 treatise on malicious prosecution and false 
imprisonment compiled thousands of cases.  See MARTIN L. NEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Chicago, Callahan & Co. 1892).   
